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In the long run the economic incidence of a tax is unaﬀected by
w h e t h e rat a xi sl e v i e do nw o r k e r s ,c o n s u m e r so r￿rms. In the short
run, however, with wages and prices not fully ￿exible the incidence
may be diﬀerent. We test this hypothesis using aggregate time series
data and examine the implications of tax incidence for the level and
persistence of unemployment.
∗Preliminary. Email comments to vincent.hogan@ucd.ie
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Are high taxes responsible for high unemployment in Europe? Many com-
mentators take it for granted that they are. In a leading article reviewing the
performance of the French economy, the Economist commented that ￿[The
French tax system] still relies far too much on employment-killing payroll
taxes￿.1 P r o f e s s i o n a le c o n o m i s t sh a v et e n d e dt ob eal i t t l em o r es a n g u i n e ,
recognising that the multiplicity of interacting eﬀects in general equilibrium
means that the identi￿cation of any causal relationship is very diﬃcult (see
Bean, 1994). Nevertheless taxation has often been cited in the literature as
o n eo fan u m b e ro fp o s s i b l ec a u s e so fu n e m p l o y m e n t( s e eL a y a r d ,N i c k e l l&
Jackman, 1991).
The question of whether taxes cause unemployment is intimately related
to the question of what is the incidence of those taxes and how that incidence
varies over time. If it is the case that the burden of the taxes falls entirely
on the workers, then the cost of labor is unaﬀected and the tax has no impli-
cations for unemployment. Taxes may still induce a labour supply response
(i.e. a reduction in labour force participation or in hours worked), but this
is distinct from any change in involuntary unemployment. Thus the quote
from the Economist, and the conventional wisdom it represents, are wrong
unless it can be shown that the burden of taxes is shifted, to some extent,
onto employers.
T h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h eb u r d e no ft a x e si ss h i f t e df r o mo n eg r o u pt o
another, can itself vary over time. For example an income tax may be for-
mally levied on workers. Following any increase in that tax, we would expect
to see take-home wages fall. But over time, if labour market conditions are
favourable, workers may succeed in passing the burden of taxes to ￿rms via
wage increases higher than would otherwise have been the case.
The interest of both pundits and economists in the possibility of a causal
link between taxation and the level and persistence of unemployment, has
been stimulated by recent OECD experience. There appears to be a corre-
lation between high taxation and high unemployment, both across countries
and through time. For example, Blanchard & Katz (1997) have commented,
the low tax and low unemployment US economy is often cited as prima facia
evidence that taxes cause unemployment.
During the 1980s and 1990s a substantial literature sought to measure
the causal link between taxes and unemployment via the estimation of small
scale models of the macro economy using aggregate data.2 The empirical re-
1The Economist.December 1996
2See for example Bean & Dreze (1990), Bean, Layard & Nickell (1986), Layard & Nickell
(1986), Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991), and Whelan (1995). The various papers co-
2sults were ambiguous, with the size and signi￿cance of the estimated eﬀects
of the tax system varying across countries. For example, Layard, Nickell
& Jackman (1991) ￿nd that the eﬀect of taxes on unemployment is statisti-
cally insigni￿cant in eight countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Canada, USA,
Japan, Austria, Switzerland) and positive and signi￿cant in four (France, Ire-
land, Finland, UK).
In this paper we adopt an alternative approach. We estimate parsimo-
nious dynamic reduced form models in order to see whether unemployment
and wages respond to exogenous changes in tax policy in a way consistent
with theory. By estimating reduced forms we avoid the problem of having
to specify exclusion restrictions necessary to identify a full structural model.
We place just enough structure on the data to deal with the reverse causality
from activity to taxation. The cost of this procedure is that the model is
vulnerable to the Lucas Critique. Furthermore, a reduced from model can-
not identify the mechanism by which tax aﬀects unemployment. We address
these issues later.
A similar procedure was used by Poterba, Rotemberg & Summers (1986)
to test for the presence of nominal rigidities. They treated changes in tax
policy as being exogenous shocks to the price structure and used them to
identify the eﬀect of money on output. In eﬀect we treat the tax changes as
shocks to the structure of real wages and use this to test for the presence of
real wage rigidities.
More recently related topics have been examined by other authors. Alesina
and Perotti (1995) use panel data for a sample of OECD member states, to
show that countries￿ unit labour costs, relative to trading partners, tended
to increase as direct taxes rose. They suggest that about one third of direct
t a x e sw e r ep a s s e do nt o￿rms. Blanchard and Perotti (1999) also examined a
related issue. They looked at the eﬀect of taxation (and government expen-
diture) on output. They found that multipliers were positive, but typically
small i.e. close to one.
The paper is organized as follows: Section two outlines a simple model
of the interaction of taxes and unemployment. Section three discusses the
methodology and the data. Section four presents the results. Section ￿ve
concludes.
2 A Review of the Theory
The question of whether labor market taxes cause unemployment is essen-
tially a question of the incidence of those taxes. If it is the case that the
authored by Layard, Nickell, Jackman and Bean are typical and much imitated.
3burden of the taxes falls entirely on the workers, then the cost of labor does
not rise and the tax has no implications for unemployment. Thus the ques-
tion reduces to one of whether, and to what extent, the burden of taxes is
shifted onto employers.
In order to ￿x ideas, consider the following simple model. Assume that the
presence of some ineﬃciency prevents the market from clearing to the point
where workers reservation wage equals the value of the marginal productivity
of their labor to ￿rms. The market wage is some multiple of the reservation
wage as in (1a) where W is the market wage, W R is the reservation wage (the
worker￿s outside option), P is the consumer price index and τ is the income
tax rate and B() is the markup function decreasing in unemployment, u, and
increasing in other variables, X. Firms then set employment, given the wage,
a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 b )w h e r eg is an increasing function of the product wage (s










,Z)( 1 b )
The precise form of B() depends on the precise nature of the ineﬃ-
ciency generating unemployment. Models such as Diamond (1982), Pis-
sarides (1990) and Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) as well as the model estimated
by Layard et. al. (1991) all include a ￿wage setting￿ equation of the form
(1a).
We can use this toy model to analyse the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s i n gt a x e s .
From equation (1a), we see that an increase in τ will result in higher un-
employment. The imposition of a tax on wage income will initially reduce
workers take-home pay. As soon as contracts can be renegotiated workers
will seek to shift the burden to ￿rms in the form of a higher gross wage. If
they succeed, ￿rms will respond by cutting back on hires.3
If there was some way that the income tax could be levied on the workers￿
o u t s i d eo p t i o na l s o ,i tw o u l dl e a dt ol e s so fa ne ﬀect on unemployment. In
fact if the tax rates on inside and outside options were the same then τ
would factor out of (1a) and the tax would have no eﬀect on the markup
over the reservation wage.4 The incidence of the tax would fall entirely on








ψ where ψ =[ G1B1WR/s − (1 − τ)]/p < 0a n dF1 is the partial derivative of
the function F with respect of its ￿rst argument.
4For example, if the reservation wage is equal to unemployment bene￿ts and if bene￿ts
are taxable at the same rate as wage income, then WR =( 1 − τ)b.
4the workers and there would be no eﬀect on unemployment. An important
practical example of this is a general sales tax. This would, in eﬀect, be a
t a xo ni n c o m eb o t hi na n do u to fe m p l o y m e n t( v i aa ni n c r e a s ei nθ)a n ds o
would have no eﬀect on bargained wage or unemployment.5 For this reason
most empirical papers assumed that sales taxes do not have an eﬀect on
unemployment (see Layard et. al.,1991).
Bean (1994) points out that we might expect that the workers bear the
entire burden of the tax in the long run. A permanent increase in taxation will
reduce permanent income and consumption. This will increase the marginal
utility of consumption relative to the marginal utility of leisure, implying
that the reservation wage will fall. It is not hard to design a speci￿cs e tu p
where the net result is no change in the mark-up and therefore the wage.6
Thus the incidence of the tax falls completely on workers.
This would imply that even a permanent increase in taxes would have
only a temporary (although possibly long lasting) eﬀect on unemployment.
(A fact explicitly assumed by many researchers who include only the change
in taxes in their regressions). There is still scope for taxes to have a long run
impact on unemployment, however, if the reservation wage re￿ects, not just
the value of leisure, but workers aspirations also. Precisely how long it takes
for reservation wages to adjust (if ever) will determine how long it takes for
the incidence of taxes to shift and for unemployment to adjust.
To take an extreme example, suppose that pride ensures that an unem-
ployed individual will never accept a job at a wage lower than the wage he
received during a previous period of employment i.e. the reservation wage
is ￿xed W R
t = W0. The burden of the tax shifts entirely to ￿rms, implying
that permanent increases in taxation will have a permanent eﬀect on unem-
ployment. Following a tax increase, a worker still seeks the same after tax
wage as he had before, despite the fact that this wage is now economically
infeasible for the (marginal) employer. Unemployment results and will last
for as long as aspirations fail to adjust to the new reality.
Hogan (1999b) examined this possibility using micro data and found that
the wage in the pervious job had a small but signi￿cant eﬀect on reservation
wages even controlling for current market wages and individual unobserved
eﬀects. Other things being equal, those unemployed, who previously had a
job paying a wage one percent above average now had a reservation wage





6Suppose that WR equals the marginal rate of substitution of consumption (c)f o r
leisure(l) where utility is u(ct,l t)=l nct+lnlt and ct = rY(1−τ)w i t hY being permanent
income. Substituting into (1a) will yield an expression independent of the tax rate.
5size of this previous wage eﬀect tended to diminish with increasing length of
unemployment spell.
In summary, there are two points to take from this model. Firstly the
incidence of a tax depends on to what extent the tax eﬀects the workers
outside option ￿ the reservation wage. In particular a sales tax will probably
have less of an eﬀect on the labour market because it taxes the outside
option also. Secondly the long term eﬀect of any tax depends on how the
reservation wage adjusts. There is no reason to expect that adjustment
to take place quickly. Indeed complete adjustment may never take place,
raising the possibility that changes in taxes could have permanent eﬀects on
unemployment.
3M e t h o d o l o g y & D a t a
3.1 Identi￿cation
In essence we want to estimate a dynamic system such as (2), where A(L)i s
a matrix of lag polynomials,U is the natural logarithm of the unemployment
rate, W is the natural log of wages, τ is the income tax rate and θ is the
sales tax rate.
A(L)Yt = εt
Yt =( Ut,W t,Surplust,τ,θ)0
(2)
The system (2) can be viewed as the reduced form of (1a) if we note that
p =( 1+θ)s and model the potentially slow adjustment of reservation wages
by making W R a distributed lag of the other variables. We model τ and
θ as the share of taxes in GDP as the tax system is too complicated for
us to think in terms of a single tax rate observable in aggregate data. We
also include budget balance as a share of GDP, surplus, to account for the
cyclical and demand side eﬀects and also to allow us to focus on balanced
budget changes in taxation.
Estimates of (2) will be biased due to the feedback from activity to taxes
i.e. the unwanted eﬀects of unemployment on measured tax rates. Because
the true tax rates are not proportional and are not levied on all of GDP,
and because recessions do not eﬀect all the income distribution uniformly, it
is probable that the measured tax/GDP ratios, τ and θ, will vary over the
business cycle as a result of compositional eﬀects.7
7For example, if a recession reduces the incomes of lower paid workers more than higher
paid workers, and if the true tax system is progressive, we could observe tax share to rise
while unemployment is also rising. Similarly, if sales taxes are levied more on luxury goods
6Poterba, Rotemberg & Summers (1986), developed a simple way of com-
bating this reverse causality. They calculate a ￿tax policy mix￿ variable,
tmix, which is equal to the diﬀerence between the aggregate income tax
rate, τ, and the aggregate sales tax rate, θ and use this as a regressor in
place of τ and θ.T h e i d e a i s t h a t tmix is more likely capture true exoge-
nous changes in policy than are the aggregate tax rates. These aggregate
tax rates vary over time as the result of both policy shocks and in response
to (endogenous) cyclical variation in GDP such as the automatic stabilizer
identi￿ed above. If the elasticity of τ with regard to GDP has the same sign
as elasticity of θ, tmix will oﬀset the two sources of bias. To the extent that
reverse causality still exits, the results will suﬀer from simultaneous equation
bias. Nevertheless, such as bias will be smaller than that which would result
from using the aggregate tax rates as separate regressors.
In any case the tax policy mix variable is particularly appropriate for a
model of labour market. As we saw in the last section, we expect that direct
and indirect taxes would have very diﬀerent eﬀects on the labour market. In
particular we would expect that a shift away from direct taxation to indirect
taxation that leaves the budget balance unaﬀected, would tend to decrease
the level of unemployment. We estimate the reduced form (3)
Yt = α(L)Yt−1 + γ(L)Tmixt + εt
Yt =( Ut,W t,Surplust)0
(3)
Poterba, Rotemberg and Summers justify their assertion that tmix is
exogenous in their model by presenting evidence that it is not Granger caused
by other variables in the model. In our setup output, unemployment and
the wage fail to Granger cause tmix.8 They also noted that their results
were relatively unchanged when only the lagged tmix was included in the
regressions. Similarly, our point estimates are also unaﬀected by dropping
contemporaneous value of tmix, but the error bands are much wider.
In their study of the dynamic eﬀects of taxation and government expen-
diture on output, Blanchard and Perotti (1999) use institutional information
to combat the reverse causality from activity to taxation. They carefully
examine each separate class of taxes and use information regarding the tax
code to calculate the size of the bias resulting from the reverse causality. In
essence their approach boils down to using the elasticity of tax revenue to
i.e. on goods with high income elasticities, we would observe a fall in sales taxes coincident
with a rise in unemployment.
8For the null hypothesis that X does not Granger cause tmix, the p-values are: 0.3
where X is Wage, 0.06 where X is unemployment, 0.77 where X is Surplus and 0.39
where X is GDP. The test regressions included two lags of each variable.
7calculate the size of the impact of changes in output on tax revenue. These
elasticities were calculated by Giorno et. al. (1995) by simulating the eﬀect
of changes in GDP on a model of each OECD member￿s tax system. These
elasticities are not estimated econometrically, but are calculated from a sim-
pli￿ed version of each country￿s actual tax code. Giorno et. al. report that
the elasticity of income tax with respect to GDP in the UK was 1.3o v e r
our sample period. They also report that the elasticity of indirect taxes was
unity. It is important to note however, that this value of unity was simply
assumed and did not result from a simulation of the tax system. On this ev-
idence, to the extent that we accept the assumed value of unity for sales tax
elasticity, there would be a slight bias in (3). For every one percent increase
in activity there would be a 0.3 percent increase in the tax mix variable.
Alesina and Perotti (1995) also looked at similar issues to our paper.
They took a diﬀerent approach, regressing the Unit Labour Costs on the
share of labour market taxes in GDP for a panel of OECD member states.
They argue that endogeneity of taxes is not a serious problem in practice
because the bias induced by supply and demand shocks would tend to cancel
each other out. They also argue that the endogeneity would be accounted
for by the inclusion of an output gap variable or some other variable to take
account the business cycle (such as the Surplus in our setup).
The reduced form approach is open to the Lucas critique. However, we
would argue that the Lucas critique is not that relevant in so far as we are not
particularly interested in estimating behavioural relationships. In so far as
we are concerned with measuring the incidence of taxes and how it varies over
time, the only issue is whether our tax variable truly represents changes in
taxation or is contaminated by feedback from activity to tax revenue. Once
we have dealt with the reverse causality issue, we simply track the eﬀect
of exogenous tax changes on the labour market through time. However,
we can make predictions for the eﬀect of tax changes only to the extent
that future changes are drawn from the same distribution as those in our
estimation sample. On the other hand if the tax changes contemplated are
fundamentally diﬀerent from those that occurred in the past we cannot be
con￿dent in our prediction regarding their future economic incidence because
we cannot be con￿dent that the reaction of agents will be the same as in the
past. In order to make prediction in this sort of situation we would have to
estimate a structural model of behavioural equations.
Finally note that the impact of taxes has been well analysed in detail
in the context of competitive labour markets by many authors.9 These pa-
9See Blundell et. al (1999) for a recent example and Pencaval (1986) for a survey of
techniques.
8pers usually involve explicit welfare analysis facilitated by estimation of be-
havioural equations, but do so in the context of zero unemployment. In this
paper we focus on the dynamic eﬀect of taxes on unemployment and wages.
As we use a reduced form no explicit welfare analysis along these lines is possi-
ble, other than to note that an reasonable welfare function would presumable
be declining in unemployment and increasing in wages. Hogan (1999a) went
some way towards reconciling the two approaches.
3.2 Data
We conduct the analysis using data on the UK economy (1961-1999) drawn
from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF and Economic Out-
look of the OECD. Table 1 reports the precise variables and gives details of
transformations applied to the data. Several points are worth noting about
the data. Firstly we follow Poterba, Rotemberg and Summers (1986) and
transform the empirical tax shares to take account of the fact that GDP is
reported at market (i.e. after tax) prices. Secondly, direct taxes does not
include social security taxes because the data is unavailable for most of the
sample period. Indirect taxes includes the VAT, excise taxes and other duties
levied on goods and services. We do not net transfers out of direct taxes nor
do we subtract subsidies from indirect taxes as much of the data is missing.
We applied a battery of tests to determine whether the series used (lnW,
lnU, Surplus, tmix) contained unit roots. Standard ADF test could not reject
the null hypothesis that the series had unit roots. This result was robust even
when deterministic trends were included in the testing equations. We might
have strong priors that the surplus (as a share of GDP) and unemployment
rate do not have unit roots as theory would suggest that both should be mean
reverting. However, the formal tests suggest otherwise.10 For this reason we
remain agnostic about the order of integration of these variables and do not
force them to have unit roots by including only their ￿rst diﬀerences in the
regressions. This also allows us to test for possibility that taxes could have
permanent eﬀects on the labour market.
The only obviously trending series is the wage rate. We could model the
trend in wages by including a linear trend in the regression or by forcing a unit
root by including the wages as a ￿rst diﬀerence. However theory suggests that
productivity is likely to be the major determinant of the long run behaviour
of real wages, so we model the trend in (log) wages by subtracting from
10Blanchard and Perotti report that they could not reject the hypotheis that the US
de￿c i th a dau n i tr o o ta tb e l o wt h e5 %s i g n i ￿cance level. They also cite other recent
evidence along the same lines. Presumably these are all examples of low power of the
ADF tests when the true process I(0) but with slow mean reversion.
9the wage variable it the Hodrick-Prescott ￿ltered productivity (A).11 The
resulting transformed variable is still I(1) but does not exhibit any obvious
trend.12 This adjusted wage variable is tantamount to using a unit labour
cost variable as in Alesina and Perotti (1995). The transformation does not
really aﬀect the empirical results in the sense that the point estimates are
m o r eo rl e s st h es a m eb u tt h ec o n ￿dence bands are slightly wider when log
wages are used are used.
4 Empirical Results
Equation (3) was estimated where Y =( l n w,lnU,Surplus)a n dtmix =
lnτ − lnθ,where the variables are de￿ned in Table 1. The inclusion of two
lags of Y and two lags of tmix (in addition to the contemporaneous value)
was suﬃcient to generate white noise residuals.13 It is important to note that
our model is speci￿ed in the levels of variables. Most studies (for example,
Alesina and Perotti, 1995) include the change in the tax rate as a regressor
rather than the tax rate itself. This speci￿cation implicitly accepts the idea
that taxes have only short run eﬀects on unemployment and wages.
The estimated coeﬃcients from (3) can be used to calculate the impulse
response of Y to permanent and temporary shocks to tmix. Figure 1 plots
the response of the system to a temporary (i.e. lasting one period only)
increase in tmix. This shock represents a one percentage point increase in
the share of direct taxes in GDP relative to the share of indirect taxes in
GDP. For illustrative purposes, we can think of an increase in tmix as an
increase in direct taxes by one percentage point.14 As we are interested
in the incidence of taxes, we do not report the response of lnw itself, but
instead the response of the consumption wage (cwage) and the producer wage
(pwage) calculated from the response of lnw where cwage =l nw+ln(1−τ)
and pwage =l nw +l n ( 1+θ). The dotted lines in the graph represent 90%
con￿dence bands that were constructed using a bootstrap with 1,000 draws
with replacement from the estimated residuals.15
11We use Holdrick-Prescott ￿ltered productivity because measured productivity is likely
to be endogenous in the short run due to labour hoarding and measurement error.
12A formal test of this hypothesis H0 : δ =0 ,ρ = 1 in yt = α+δt+ρyt−1+εt produces
an F-statistic of 3.61. The critical value of this (non-conventional) distribution is 5.61 at
10% signi￿cance level (see Hamilton, 1994, pp.764)
13The Q statistics on the residuals produced p-values 0.14 for the lnU equation, 0.66
for the surplus equation and 0.4 for the lnw equation.
14As we are using logs we need to assume an initial level for τ and θ.W eu s et h es a m p l e
averages of 17% and 15% repectively.
15Con￿dence bands were also constructed by drawing from a multivariate normal dis-
10Figure 1 shows that the increase in that income tax rate of one percentage
point results in an immediate decline in the workers￿ consumption wage. Note
however, that the take-home wage falls by less than the full amount of the
tax even in the initial period. Some of the burden of taxes is passed on to
employers, as is evident from the second panel which shows the response of
the producers wage. As expected, the increase in labour costs leads to an
increase in unemployment, as can be seen from the third panel. Note that the
increase in unemployment occurs with a lag. Over time the market returns
to its initial equilibrium position. Within two years we cannot reject the
hypothesis (at the 10% signi￿cance level) that the the consumption wage is
back to its initial level. The producer wage also drops very quickly, in fact
it seems to overshoot (although the overshoot is not statistically signi￿cant
at the 10% level).
Unemployment seems to react with a lag. by the time it has reached its
maximum value, the producer wage has already returned to its initial value.
Note also that the size of the eﬀect on unemployment is small even though it
is signi￿cant. Even at its maximum point, unemployment rose only by seven
percent.16 Overall the eﬀect of the temporary tax change is small and not
long lasting ￿ but it is statistically signi￿cant.
The above simulations were for the case of temporary changes in tax pol-
icy. Probably of more interest is what happens when there is a permanent
change in the tax policy mix. As explained in section two theory would sug-
gest that permanent changes in the tax system could have long lasting eﬀects
on unemployment and producer wages, but we would expect the reservation
to adjust eventually leading to neutrality in the long run. The null hypoth-
esis that taxes are neutral in the long run can also be tested by testing the
hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on tmix s u mt oz e r oi ne a c he q u a t i o n .T h i s
hypothesis can actually be rejected at reasonable signi￿cance levels.17
We can also get an idea for this long run behaviour by examining the
co-integration between the variables. A Johansen test (assuming no deter-
ministic trends in the data) cannot reject the hypothesis that there are at
most two co-integrating vectors at the 5% signi￿cance level.
In order to illustrate the neutrality of the tax policy mix in the long run
tribution with the same covariance matrix as the estimated residuals. The two are sets
of bands are almost identical re￿ecting the fact that the estimated residuals are approxi-
mately normal. Jarque-Bera statitics have p-values in excess of 0.6 for all three residual
series.
16i.e. if unemployment was initially 10% of the labour force, the tax change would cause
it to rise to 10.7%
17A Wald test produces a test statistic of 7.165, which is distributed under the null as
χ2 with three degrees of freedom leading to a p-value of 0.07.
11we need to look at the impulse response of the variables to a permanent one
percentage point increase in tmix.18 T h er e s u l t sa r es h o w ni n￿gure 2 which
mirrors ￿gure one in its construction. Unsurprisingly the initial eﬀect of the
tax increase is to cause the consumption wage to fall. But the producer
wage also exhibits a statistically signi￿cant increase, indicating that workers
shift some of the burden of income taxes to ￿rms quite quickly. Over time
the producer wage falls back so that it is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from its
initial level. Again the producer wage seems to overshoot for some reason, but
the overshooting is not statistically signi￿cant. The consumer wage remains
permanently (and signi￿cantly) below its initial value indicating that workers
bear the burden of taxation in the long run.
The unemployment rate rises in response to the increase in taxes, which
is not surprising given the behaviour of the producer wage. What is more
surprising is that it does not fall back at any stage. This is curious given that
the burden of taxes is shifted completely to the workers within a few years.
Unemployment stablises at about a 50% increase. This is a huge eﬀect from
what was a relatively small change in the tax system. This result ￿ a large
and persistent increase in unemployment ￿ is robust to diﬀerent speci￿cations
of trend, diﬀerent number of lags and other changes in speci￿cation. But it
is too large to be fully credible. It goes against common sense and most of
the rest of the literature (although much of that literature simply assumed
that taxes could not have a long run eﬀect). One can only speculate what
generates this eﬀect, some sort of hysteresis perhaps. I suspect that problem
is that there have been relatively few permanent changes in tax policy in the
estimation sample. The reduced form can only retrieve those correlations
that occur in the data. This is where we could really bene￿tf r o mh a v i n ga
credible structural model. If we could estimate genuine behavioural equations
then we could simulate agents￿ reactions to permanent changes in tax policy,
providing we could be sure that those changes did not aﬀect the structure of
the model.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We set out to measure the incidence of taxes in the labour market. The
results were pretty striking. A shift in tax policy away from indirect to
direct taxes seems to have the eﬀects predicted by theory. The burden of the
tax is shared by the workers and employers and as a result unemployment
rises. Even a temporary tax change, which itself disappears after 1 year, has
real eﬀects which persist for up to 4 years. The eﬀects on unemployment
18The sample average size of a change in tmix was 0.8 percentage points.
12last a couple of years longer than the eﬀects on the consumer and producer
wages indicating the presence of some persistence in unemployment.
The persistence of the real eﬀects of taxes is even more starkly illustrated
by the reaction to a permanent shock to taxes. It appears that a permanent
shock has permanent eﬀect on unemployment and the consumption wage, but
a temporary eﬀect on the real product wage. This result is consistent with
theory, but is nevertheless unusual. The size of the eﬀect on unemployment
is very large. Why we get this result needs further research, but it does cast
doubt on the speci￿cation often used in the literature that impose long run
neutrality on the estimates.
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14Table 1: Data
Variable De￿nition Source3& Construction Code
SURP Government Surplus IFS 80...ZF...
Y Nominal GDP OECD EO GDP
A Labour Productivity OECD EO PDTY
PC Consumption Price De￿ator OECD EO PCP
U Unemployment Rate OECD EO UNR
WRB Wage Rate in Business Sector OECD EO WR
S Indirect Taxes OECD EO IND
T Direct taxes levied on households OECD EO TYH
ﬂ τ Direct tax share T/Y -
ﬂ θ Indirect Tax share S/Y -
τ Direct tax share (adjusted)1 (1 + ﬂ θ) ∗ ﬂ τ -
θ Indirect tax share (adjusted)1 ﬂ θ/(1 − ﬂ θ)-
Surplus S u r p l u sa ss h a r eo fG D P SURP/Y -
tmix tax policy mix lnτ − lnθ -
W Real wage WRB/P C -
lnw log Real wage adjusted for productivity2 lnW − HP(lnA)-
1. Adjusted because GDP is measured in after tax prices
2. HP: Hodrick-Prescott Filtered
3. EO: OECD Economic Outlook. IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF
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